


# Grierson in South Africa

*Culture, state  
and  
nationalist ideology  
in the South African  
film industry:  
1940-1981*

(Part One)

by Keyan Tomaselli



• John Grierson about the time of his South Africa report

Like Canada, South Africa is divided by language. A further factor is that of race. 'Culture' is the mechanism that the South African state uses to legitimize apartheid, and cinema has been an important means of shaping perceptions of what social relations should be in such a context.

The historical connections between the state and private capital, cultural production and ideology thus provide the terrain for an analysis of cultural protectionism in South Africa, both in terms of international influences and inter-cultural struggles within the country itself.

## Initial deliberations

The Cilliers Film Committee, which reported in 1943, aimed to stimulate the growth of a purely South African, but more specifically white Afrikaans cinema, by forcing exhibitors to screen Afrikaans-language shorts at every performance.<sup>1</sup> English-speaking critics reacted vociferously. The *Union Review* described committee chairman Professor A.C. Cilliers as "a lifelong nationalist" educated in Germany, whose aim was to succour Afrikaner nationalist cultural enterprises.<sup>2</sup>

The ideological discourse adopted by the Cilliers committee was derived from the growing momentum of Afrikaner nationalism: "rich national life", "spread of national culture", "spiritual content", "making our society bilingual", "cultural protection" and so on. These repetitively articulated affirmations found exposure in a new site of cultural struggle, the state machinery. Such rhetoric had previously been restricted to non-official Afrikaner cultural groups, amateur Afrikaans filmmaking organizations and other associations, all of which were pledged to taking over the English-dominated economy and transforming it into a *volkskapitalisme* (a people's capitalism).

Although no practical consequences flowed from the Cilliers Report, it did have the effect of legitimizing Afrikaner cultural affirmations through the use of cinema. The committee, for example, argued that in view of South Africa's "peculiar racial and economic cir-

Of Britain's former colonies, Australia has perhaps gone furthest in decolonizing its cultural production, and the success of the Australian film provides a telling standard of measurement. If the Canadian situation remains grimly problematic (not to say still colonial), a look at South Africa's film industry provides a reflection which, while wildly different from our own in some respects, is at the same time curiously familiar.

And not only because of the key role played by John Grierson. If Grierson's Canadian involvement is well-known, his South Africa consultation is not. And as Keyan Tomaselli documents below, Grierson's misreading of white South African nationalism could suggest the

intriguing possibility that he might have equally misread nationalism in Canada. Certainly Grierson's blindness to 'the French fact' in Canada, when combined with his South African aporia, could provide some clues towards a reconsideration of Grierson's Canadian role.


Again, as Tomaselli details, the case of South Africa (or any national cinema) documents once more the utter centrality of the role of the state in advancing or retarding the development of a national film industry. For those who tend to discount the influence of the state's power in defining and using 'culture' for self-serving ends, the case of South Africa's film industry provides an instructive, negative example.

Thirdly, South Africa provides yet

another instance of film industry narrowmindedness and the almost classic preference for immediate, short-term solutions, chronic dependency on government, and fear of experimentation. As Tomaselli usefully shows in the South African example, this is more an ideological phenomenon than an economic one, and that it, in turn, leads to mediocre films and even greater dependence on the state hardly needs emphasizing.

Finally, through the exaggerated prism of Afrikaner nationalism, at odds with the state on the one hand and the industry on the other, the South African example offers a sobering reflection — as through a glass darkly — upon Canadian cultural nationalism itself.

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**GRIERSON'S  
SOUTH AFRICAN REPORT:  
AN EXCERPT**

*"Above all, South Africa should approach the task with confidence and even, it may be, in a spirit of assertion. The case of Canada is interesting in this regard. At the outset of its film development, it was, in most cultural respects, riddled with spiritual colonialism: measuring itself at every turn against the examples of Europe and the United States. In nothing has the National Film Board of Canada so justified itself as in the work it has done to destroy this national atmosphere: not only by giving the Canadians a powerful and confident sight of themselves as a world power, but by, itself, in a spirit of great self-confidence, successfully staking its claim in the international film world. This naturally involved a considerable effort in seeking out imaginative talent and encouraging experiment. In the issue it has been amply justified."*

cumstances, any case for the protection of the South African film industry should be based more on cultural than on directly economic grounds," and that "the economic life of a nation is closely linked up with its cultural life."

Realizing that "culture" had a reciprocal effect in a market economy, the committee concluded: "Judged by modern standards, the higher the standard of culture, the greater the demand for the various products of agriculture and industry." Individuals, said the committee, formed the "foundation" of culture, while the emergence and maintenance of "a high standard of culture" is conditional upon "the supplementation and augmentation of individual effort by the organized and organizing power of the whole — ... the state." The state, in turn, is responsible for "cultural functions" which are "beyond the powers of private initiative, whether individual or collective." In other words, the state should manage the social organization of discourse through the shielding of both the material and spiritual elements of "culture." Part of this protection from alien discourses concerned the oft-repeated Afrikaner criticism of cinema as "an escape from reality into a dream world of make-believe and fancy," an escape that became "the cultural El Dorado of the masses." The effects of this cinematic displacement of reality, "Unless carefully watched and correctly guided... can indeed play havoc with the moral, mental, and cultural make-up of a nation. Its demoralizing and denationalising potentialities are incalculable."

The committee argued that cinema should be used as a "healing and formative influence" to a better understanding between the various sections of the South African political and racial milieu, notably the cultural and language barriers that divide English and Afrikaans speakers. While aware that the private industry would resist state attempts at intervention, the committee also hoped capitalist common sense would persuade the film industry "to agree in the national interest." The issue concerned the increased production of films in Afrikaans and since "the essence of good showmanship is to give the audience what they want," it was felt that the industry would not resist the call. (At this time, 100% of cinema programmes, apart from local newsreels, were in English).

The committee recommended the establishment of a National Film Board to produce documentaries aimed "at presenting essential industries, ways of living and environment of normal people in such a way that the appeal is no less dramatic than that of the fiction film, in which life is often reconstructed in an exaggerated way." The board was thus intended to provide an ideological portrayal of life in terms of the reciprocal relationship between "national culture" and the economy, since white documentary filmmakers were seen as "trustees of the native and other non-European races," who needed "to make the public aware of the world it lives in, to show up the romance and dramatic quality of reality, and thus make the real experience of one the imaginary experience of all" (emphasis added).

Against the background of the Voortrekker Centenary Celebrations held just five years earlier, controversies surrounding the interpretation of South African history by a number of films in the '30s made directly or indirectly with state involvement, and the internment of many leading Afrikaner nationalist Nazi sympathizers during the Second World War (some of

whom were aspiring filmmakers), the Cilliers Report was explosive.

Objecting to the proposed government dictatorship of the film industry, the English-language *Union Review* stated:

*There are two languages in this country for official purposes, but that while bilingualism is, therefore, correctly enforceable in the public service, the schools (government schools, that is), Parliament and the courts... it is not enforceable in private life — i.e. in the home, the club, the office and the cinema. "But," say the mugwumps, "it will enable the English-speaking section to improve their knowledge of Afrikaans." What is cinema — a place of entertainment or a night school? Professor Cilliers puts it more elegantly — having had a lot of practice in political persuasiveness — thus: "The theatre-going public will have the additional pleasure of seeing the various aspects of our rich national life portrayed on the screen through the medium of one or both of our two national languages." But many of us do not want to see our "rich national life" portrayed in our leisure-time and at our expense. We want to see Rita Hayworth. Anyway, this is a dangerous argument. If accepted, we should be shown District Six and Johannesburg's 'Shanty Town' and the ruined reserves and the Indian shums of Durban.*

Realising that the Cilliers recommendations created more problems than answers, the government sought to ameliorate the problem by appointing yet another committee. The Smith committee responded in December 1944.<sup>3</sup> Its proposals differed markedly, suggesting a consolidation of the various government film units into a National Film Board concerned with the "production, distribution and exhibition of educational, instructional, informative and publicity films which were not normally intended for exhibition in commercial cinemas." Films of a commercial character were to remain the province of the industry.

The recommendations of this second committee were clearly of a less sectional nature than the Cilliers Report and served the needs of the national economy rather than merely one fraction of it. The government, however, made no move and the South-African-owned English-language Schlesinger film monopoly remained safe from state interference.

**The Grierson report**

After the Nationalists came to power in 1948, the government engaged John Grierson to advise on the establishment of a national film board.

Grierson's theoretical position was close to the hearts of the Afrikaners who supported his appointment. His objectives were to open up "the screen on the real world" where "Documentary would photograph the living scene and the living story."<sup>4</sup> Nationalist filmmakers had finetuned their techniques through a technicist reading of Eisenstein which they assumed were similar to those of Grierson. KARFO (Afrikaans Christian Film-Making Organisation), in particular, saw a duty in using cinema to aid the urban socialisation of hundreds of thousands of Afrikaners who had migrated to the cities between 1903-1940. The KARFO report to Grierson, for example, stated:

*conditions of real life. If the 'variety of situations' which it depicts digresses from reality to any extent it will become clear that it may be more confusing than helpful to whoever may look upon the cinema as a source of information through which he can come to a better understanding of his own environment. The types of problems and situations dramatized must be more or less the same type of problem and situation for which modes of conduct and behaviour are sought... otherwise we can only expect the cinema to add to the confusion and bewilderment which we face in life today.<sup>5</sup>*

Both Grierson and KARFO claimed that cinema, as it was popularly shown, substituted fantasy for reality. However, neither were aware that the realities they wished to depict were constituted by very specific ideological contexts. Grierson's idea of realism was to provide the individual with information which s/he could more effectively participate in democratic social processes. This view implies choice, but choice is relative to what the state will allow. Thus, both KARFO and Grierson wanted to use film which, by definition, was already ideologically laden. KARFO's more literal interpretation, although appearing to offer choice, does not in fact do so. For it, realism is a simple correspondence between prescription — a sort of 'what ought to be' — an attempt at socialising the newly urbanized Afrikaner into a Christian urban society. KARFO seems to have offered itself to the state as an ideological apparatus in a blatant way. Through the medium of the Church, mainly the Dutch Reformed denomination (DRC), it took it upon itself to guide cultural responses to urbanization and suggested ways of coping with the not-too-pleasant and socially alienating circumstances of city life. In other words, KARFO was not concerned with choice but with articulating a strategy of adaptation and of providing support to those members of the (white) *volk* who were in danger of succumbing to the ravages of cultural imperialism and alien ideological discourses. The response was to be in terms of traditional group values and Afrikaner nationalism: Christianity, family, cultural integrity and language. In this way KARFO mediated the interests of Afrikaner-dominated capital as it sought to prepare the recently rural Afrikaner for his role in the city, the new site for the struggle against a still English-controlled economy.

It seems not to have occurred to KARFO that Grierson's propositions were very different to Eisenstein's dialectic. The difference lies in Grierson's remark that "Cinema has a sensational capacity for enhancing movement which tradition has formed or time worn smooth."<sup>6</sup> In contrast, Eisenstein never "enhanced"; he displaced and manipulated in the name of realism. Eisenstein's "nature", corresponded to Grierson's "real world." Technical resources, particularly editing, fundamental to Eisenstein's theories of montage, removed film from the "real" world, reordering it through cutting. Grierson, among other realists, criticised Eisenstein for this. However, the Marxist base of Eisenstein's approach demanded a displacement of the "real" world, itself a construction of bourgeois ideology. It was, of course, the bourgeois class to which Afrikaans filmmakers were aspiring; ownership and control of not only the land, economy and the country's wealth, but also of the cultural heritage of the Afrikaner

*The... cinema should adhere to the*

people, and by implication — though not articulated at the time — of the communities that would have to be further subordinated to meet these objectives. It seems that this was the essence of KARFO's realism.

Grierson seems to have remarkably easily duped into accepting the Nationalist discourse on apartheid at face value. Proposing a National Film Board structure designed to counter international criticism of South Africa's racial policies, Grierson argued:

*Its problems, seen in closeup, may seem frustrating, are the best earnest of dramas (sic) in the making and a destiny to be revealed. Its vistas, both technological and human, are not only national-wide, but also Africa-wide and, in many respects, world-wide. South Africa, moreover, has the eyes of the world upon it. It has, therefore, everything to gain by giving them reality to look upon.*

*I do not propose to separate the foreign problem from the national one. I have been told by some that South Africa's greatest immediate concern is the misunderstanding of it on the part of other nations. I appreciate this point but no one in his senses will expect, by simple formula, to liquidate the host of misunderstandings and prejudices which, coming from the depths of 19th Century political formulae, now surround the considerations of South African problems. Much can, of course, be done by direct attack; for the major facets of South African development in all the spheres of technical and sociological achievement have not yet been commandingly presented.*

Grierson asserted that South Africa's high political profile needed to be complemented by more than "one of the poorest places in the distribution channels of the world." The strategy that he suggested was as follows:

*(a) conviction in high quarters that the film can and ought to be developed as an instrument of national policy; (b) an objective appreciation — free from mere film interest and film enthusiasm — of the relationship of the film to the larger and deeper processes of public information; (c) a plan of action which will, (i) serve departments in an orderly and long-term fashion, (ii) serve to inculcate patriotism, unity and drive in the Nation as a whole, (iii) present South Africa abroad in the most powerful and penetrating way and on all valuable levels of interest; and provide a direct service to the officers of External Affairs, (iv) bring into the service of the union and co-ordinate in common interest, all possible forces, other than governmental, which can contribute to the articulate presentation of the national image; not least the forces in the film industry, of the churches, and of the public relations departments of industry and commerce, with, of course, all due regard for the preservation of their free and independent initiation and development, (v) mobilize and encourage creative, technical and administrative talents to these ends.*

Grierson's plan exhibits no sense of the ideology or economic processes which

"the articulate presentation of the national image" would seek to obscure. Cinema would thus help to mystify the apartheid base of the South African "Nation" in which "patriotism", "unity" and "drive" need to be inculcated, for the plan misunderstands the nature of South African capitalism. The reason for this was that Grierson never considered the state as part of the class system. He referred rather to the state as "the machinery by which the best interests of the people are secured."<sup>8</sup> Grierson saw politics and economics as dependent upon the policies of the party in power, rather than as a structural process condoned by the hegemonic socio-economic bloc. He therefore makes the false distinction between the state and the government. Full weight is not given to the consideration that the party in power is, in fact, part of the mechanism of the state. The strategy offered by Grierson works on the benign assumption that the state is non-partisan in the constitution and execution of its policies. In this he reflects the commonly held liberal view of the state as an essentially neutral institution outside the class structure.

However, the strategy proposed by Grierson could not have served Afrikaner Nationalists better. It is difficult to see how Grierson was able to separate the "real world" from state propaganda. The latter, or in Grierson's words, the "sleeping powers as (sic) the media possesses" were apparently to be tempered by a "progressively knowledgeable review on Ministerial level, and subject to parliamentary discussion." This faith in the Westminster system is at the core of Grierson's uncritical acceptance of the South African position. The starting point for Grierson stemmed from Walter Lippman's pessimism about democracy and his disbelief that the ordinary voter could make informed judgements or political choices because of a lack of relevant information or time for consideration. In contrast, Grierson was not content to leave the citizen in blissful ignorance. Unlike KARFO which offered only a strategy of cultural adaptation for one sector of the South African population, Grierson wanted to involve all the citizens in the social process.

Grierson was always more concerned with social issues than with aesthetic questions. A reading of his South African report would clear up Williams' indecision<sup>10</sup> as to Grierson's perception of the relationship between "social purposes" and "aesthetic questions." Of the South African context, Grierson argues: "Effective distribution results are the proper measure of justified production; and no double talk — aesthetic or other — should be allowed to confuse the issue." At another level, however, Grierson shows unsubstantiated confidence in imaginative talent and the encouragement of experimentation. It seems that the latter was expected to act as checks and balances in helping South African filmmakers under the auspices of the Board to destroy, as in the case of Canada, a culture "rotted with spiritual colonialism: measure itself at every turn against the examples of Europe and the United States." The angry and heated political and racial arguments which were rife in South Africa, with English and Afrikaner pitted as antagonists, again deluded Grierson into believing that an intrinsic social value of benefit to all in South Africa would emerge from these conflicts:

*The deflated and deflationary atmosphere of many countries today is not only lacking in the spirit of 'audace';*



*and it is the presence of this quality in South African political discussion which is so striking and refreshing to the observer. South Africa can lose nothing and can only gain if it comes to invest the wider field of national expression. If South Africa has a message, this is probably it.*

The remainder of Grierson's report is devoted to "Shaping a South African Film Instrument" which was to be used to stimulate and assist informed public participation in the process of democracy. The administrative recommendations need not be discussed here. Of relevance, however, are two immediate consequences of Grierson's visit.

The first was that he was highly sceptical of "self-appointed experts" and "medium enthusiasts," whether amateur or professional. Grierson noted that this attitude may "hurt the enthusiasts" but argued that "no forces have hurt and frustrated the national use of films as much as those who have brought it into discredit by irresponsibility in the use of public funds" and furthermore, these individuals "are apt to get in the way of the purpose of the Information Service."

Grierson's visit had originally been strongly motivated by KARFO which had hoped thereby to secure state-assistance for its filmmaking activities. Ironically, it seems that the medium enthusiasts to which Grierson was referring were KARFO members themselves (Heins du Prez having submitted a lengthy document to Grierson dealing with the cultural, spiritual and social experiences, values and objectives of the Afrikaners he represented). Grierson was adamant that all funds be administered by the Board and that care be taken not to compete with the trade, for the hallmark of his programme was that documentary film encoded the ideas of intellectuals which coincided with the interests of some state and large-scale private organizations, a convergence which sprang from the common belief of the need for some form of rationalised mass society.<sup>10</sup> Karfo responded by dismantling its production unit.

A second consequence was government inertia — a National Film Board was not set up until 10 years later, in 1964. Afrikaner capital and the government had little need for a propagandistic cinema during the 1950s. The state was able to enforce its hegemony through other agencies, including radio and the press, not to mention the host of other economic, repressive and political agencies now at its command.

#### Protection from international capital

The sale of the Schlesinger film interests to 20th Century Fox in 1956 may well have jolted the government to introduce a subsidy on feature film production.<sup>11</sup> No other area of the South African industry has received more attention, criticism or praise from the press, students, consul-

tants to the state and not least, the film industry itself.

The subsidy was initially motivated by a British director working in South Africa. Bladon Peake had approached the government with a proposal for a subsidy based on the British Eady Levy. The situation was, coincidentally, already under investigation by the Department of Commerce and Industries. The Motion Picture Producers Association (MPPA), was formed on 16 July, 1956, to negotiate the terms of the subsidy.

The formula paid back to the producer the Entertainment Tax levied by the provinces on the sale of tickets collected on the screening of domestic films. The maximum payout was R20,000 or 50% of the cost, whichever was the lower. Only R6,379 was paid out during the first year. In 1962, the maximum reimbursement was amended to equal the production cost of the film, less R22,500. No subsidy was paid on the first R10,000 collected from the Tax. Between R10-12,000, payment was equal to 100%, and above that, 200%.

According to producer Tommie Meyer, this revised formula aimed (1) to root out inferior films; (2) to increase the number of films by reducing the risk for talented people; (3) to improve the quality so that local films could compete with the average overseas product; and (4) to improve the quality to the extent that some domestically produced films could be distributed overseas.<sup>12</sup>

The 1962 modification was also designed as an instrument to ameliorate the negative international image acquired by the state due to its repressive apartheid policies, while at the same time encourage a content and treatment which would suit the needs of Afrikaner-dominated capital and the hegemonic bloc in general. That is, the revisions underlay a twin objective which embraced an inter-relationship between ideology and economics. The Board of Trade and Industries' 1963 report provides a hint of how it expected cinema to be used in the service of the state:

*In view of the vivid and graphic qualities of the motion picture as a means of expression and its wide accessibility in view of the low cost of exhibition, it can be a valuable means to presenting a country's image and its way of life to the outside world... it has been pointed out to the board that even if one or two South African films could be successful in gaining access to the world's screens, they could be of inestimable value in projecting abroad an unbiased picture of conditions in the country and its way of life...*

The above-mentioned 'benefits' are recurring elements in all the reports put out by the Board during the years. Hollywood was to be the model, but the subsidy would work best with local scripts, as "non-South African themes" would not "portray our way of life to the outside world." Elsewhere the report is not so subtle. "In times of peace it can be a means of presenting a country to the world, and serve to 'sell' it and its products. In times of war it can be a means of propaganda and of psychological warfare." The basis of the sale was to be encoded in "box office successes" rather than films of a "limited appeal." Such strategy would provide "employment", earn or save foreign exchange, but also "promote social harmony" and "other desirable ends." Again, the implied 'national image' is the one determined by the state and would be mediated through



the way the film industry was economically structured. Implicit in the recommendations is the fear that films of "limited appeal" tend to communicate unorthodox views, suggesting alternatives which do not always coincide with those of the ruling hegemony.

In some respects the Board of Trade's proposals were similar to the procedures adopted by Australia in the 1970s. The Board suggested that the Industrial Development Corporation administer the subsidy, that working capital up to a maximum of 40% of the estimated cost of a film (feature or documentary) be provided in advance, and since the Corporation shared in the risk it should be entitled to a proportion of the profits. The Board further proposed the encouragement and cooperation with overseas producers in co-productions or otherwise. These proposals, however, were not put into effect.

### The National Film Board

The promulgation of the National Film Board Act of 1963, coincided with the awakening interest of Afrikaans capital in the film industry in the 1960s, as well as the tremendous cultural strains placed on Afrikaners as a result of a burgeoning economy which precipitated serious inter-racial and inter-group crises.

The Board's administrative structure differed in two important ways from the original Grierson proposals. The first was that he suggested that the Minister of the Interior be the chairman, not the Minister of Education:

*There is no good case for attaching it (the NFB) to the Ministries of Education or Health or of the Fine Arts or of Tourism... In particular, it is the strong view of those closer to the development of Public Information that the logical portfolio in a modern State is not the Ministry of Education, because of its lack of functional contact with the larger processes of technological, economic and public development outside the sphere of formal education. With this view I concur. It may even be that the scholastic or schoolman's point of view is an obstacle to the larger development of the mass media in the highly complex and informal worlds in which they are bound to operate. The key to the*

*matter is that the film in the service of the Nation is something more than an instrument of instruction and something more than an instrument of culture and art. It is not just a mirror held up to nature; it is a hammer helping to shape the future. We are dealing, to be plain, with a process which reaches out beyond the schools and the academics to the whole life of the nation and neither the pedagogic nor the aesthetic aspect of its work represents the more effective reaches of its influence.*

The Department of the Interior, however, was not suitable to the task as the government saw it. Mainly of an administrative function, its job is to regulate and register people: their race classifications, Group Areas, movements, births, deaths — a sort of human bookkeeping function. The Board was consequently placed under the Department of National Education with its racist policy of Christian National Education. Put into practice soon after the Nationalists' assumption of power in 1948, Grierson should have been aware of the purposes and nature of the direction that education was taking in South Africa at the time of his consultation. From the state's point of view, this Department offered an ideal home for the Board as it realized that the educational institution is the foremost apparatus through which ideological discourse can be disseminated. This agency was not interested in the underlying democratic assumptions which permeated Grierson's thesis but of socialising individuals into accepting as natural and desirable an apartheid-based social practice. (Indeed,

future prime-minister Hendrik Verwoerd's landmark statement that "There is no place for [the Bantu] in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour"<sup>13</sup> was made in the same year that Grierson submitted his final report to the government.)

The second important recommendation not put into practice was the Experimental Production Fund which was to have constituted between 10% and 15% of the total for national and international productions. In respect of experimentation, Grierson argued that:

*In the case of other countries, no expenditure has been more effective. It has stirred initiative over the whole undertaking and greatly increased the general morale to have a small adventurous operation in its midst. In the case of a young country, this special measure of latitude encourages the discovery of new talent in a medium which is not yet highly developed from a professional point of view.*

But despite constant representations to the government, the state remained unyielding, for experimentation — or films of "limited appeal" — tends to articulate counter-ideological discourses.

Apart from coordinated state activities in filmmaking, the NFB was entrusted with the "acquisition, production, exhibition, distribution" of films and photographs "intended for dissemination, in the Republic or elsewhere, of information regarding Southern Africa, its peoples, their way of life, culture, traditions, economic conditions and problems." It was also to give "information regarding the problems of and social evils present in the Republic and the services available and developments taking place in the Republic." Clearly framed within the doubletalk of apartheid discourse, the NFB's function was to legitimize the government's racial policies. In the absence of broadcast television, the NFB had to assume a direct responsibility for cultural production as far as short and documentary films were concerned. The Board was eventually to enter production on a large scale, competing with the private sector — or the "trade" as Grierson called it — earning the wrath of commercial producers. Where until 1966 about 60% of the private

documentary market consisted of government commissioned films, by 1972 the proportion had dropped to 30%. The introduction of television in 1976, however, heralded the dissolution of the Board in 1978, for many of its propaganda tasks could now be carried out much more effectively by the national broadcast television service.

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